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Non-Resident Expert Testimony on Local
Hospital Standards
Kent E. Baldauf*
N THE RECENT CASE of Avey v. St. Francis Hospital and School of
Nursing, Inc.,1 the Kansas Supreme Court dealt with an issue which
has caused confusion and conflict in many jurisdictions over the past
ninety years. This issue deals with the question of whether a medical
expert witness need be a resident of the particular community in order
to testify as to local hospital standards in that community.
Generally, in cases involving medical malpractice, the courts have
held that the expert witness must have practiced in the "same" or
"similar" locality as the defendant doctor in order that his testimony
be held admissible to establish the standard of medical care against which
the defendant is to be held.
2
To date, the majority of cases which have grappled with this ques-
tion of "locality" have involved the medical malpractice of physicians.
3
The Avey case deals with a slightly different subject, the medical negli-
gence of hospitals. This article deals with several of the questions raised
by the Avey case. Such questions as: Should the "same" or "similar"
locality test be applied to malpractice cases involving hospitals? Should
a new test be created?
Development of the Locality Test
The requirement that an expert witness must have practiced in
the same or in a similar locality as the defendant in order to be deemed
competent to testify as to local medical standards found its roots in
Small v. Howard.4 In this case a rural doctor attempted a difficult opera-
tion on his patient, one which the doctor had not previously conducted.
The patient died and the doctor was sued. The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in holding for the doctor stated:
* B.S., Carnegie-Mellon University; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Col-
lege of Law, Cleveland State Univ.; Engineer at General Electric Company (Cleve-
land, Ohio).
1 201 Kan. 687, 442 P.2d 1013 (1968).
2 See, Lockhart v. Maclean, 77 Nev. 210, 361 P.2d 670 (1961); DiFilippo v. Preston,
53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Riggs v. Christie, 342 Mass. 402, 173 N.E.2d 610
(1961); Cavallaro v. Sharp, 84 R.I. 67, 121 A.2d 669 (1956); Fields v. Rutledge, 284
S.W.2d 659 (Ky. App. 1955).
3 Ibid. See also, McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vand. L.
Rev. 549 (1959); Ames, Modern Technique and Trial of a Medical Malpractice Suit,
12 Vand. L. Rev. 649 (1959); Note, 60 N.W.U. L. Rev. 834 (1966); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d
772 (1949); Note, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 333 (1963).
4 128 Mass. 131, 35 Am. Rep. 363 (1880).
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.. .he was bound to possess that skill only which physicians and
surgeons of ordinary ability and skill, practicing in similar locali-
ties, with opportunities for no larger experience, ordinarily possess;
and he was not bound to possess that high degree of art and skill
possessed by eminent surgeons practicing in large cities, and making
a speciality of the practice of surgery.5
The rationale of the Small case set forth a general rule designed to
shield the country doctor against having his skill measured by the
standards of doctors practicing in larger cities. The Small case held
the doctor to the standards of ordinary skill and ability of physicians
practicing in similar localities. Later decisions restricting this view,
held that the expert witness must have practiced in the same locality
as the defendant doctor in order for his testimony to be admissible.
Some jurisdictions found this "same locality" rule too harsh or in-
applicable, especially in communities where only one practicing physi-
cian was to be found. To what standard was he to be held? When faced
with such a situation many jurisdictions rejected the "same locality"
rule and adopted the "similar or like locality', test.7 With the passing of
time, courts which had originally adopted the "same locality" rule
abandoned it because of its harshness, in favor of the "similar or like
locality" view.8
A few jurisdictions which have retained the "same locality" rule
found it practical and reasonable to extend the geographical boundaries
of the given locality.9 In Geraty v. Kaufman', the Connecticut Court
viewed the locality rule in terms of a "medical neighborhood" which
was necessarily wide enough, geographically, in that case, to embrace
both New London and New Haven.' The California Supreme Court in
Sinz v. Owens12 extended the geographical limits of the particular lo-
cality. They allowed the plaintiff's expert witness, who came from a
town within the common trade territory of a larger town which also
5 Id. at 365. Prof. Prosser points out that the original rationale for this rule was
that in early America a country doctor did not have the facilities, contacts, or op-
portunities for learning and experience afforded by larger cities. Prosser, Law of
Torts 166 (3d ed. 1964).
G Lockhart v. Maclean, supra note 2; Peterson v. Hunt, 197 Wash. 255, 84 P.2d 999
(1938); Mason v. Gedds, 258 Mass. 40, 154 N.E. 519 (1926); Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky.
20, 69 S.W. 1096 (1902); Force v. Gegory, 63 Conn. 167, 27 A. 1116 (1893). Hansen v.
Pock, 57 Mont. 51, 187 P. 282 (1920).
7 Cavallaro v. Sharp, supra note 2; Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183, 132
A.L.R. 379 (1940); Kirchner v. Dorsey & Dorsey, 226 Iowa 283, 284 N.W. 171 (1939).
s Lewis v. Johnson, 12 Cal.2d 558, 86 P.2d 99 (1939); Tennant v. Barton, 164 Wash.
279, 2 P.2d 735 (1931).
9 Viita v. Dolan, 132 Minn. 128, 155 N.W. 1077 (1916); Geraty v. Kaufman, 115 Conn.
563, 162 A. 33 (1932); Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 205 P.2d 3, 8 A.L.R.2d 757
(1949).
10 Gearty v. Kaufman, supra note 9.
11 New London is approximately 45 miles east of New Haven.
12 Sinz v. Owens, supra note 9.
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encompassed the defendant's town, to testify as to the standard of
reasonable care. The Minnesota Supreme Court in the case of Viita v.
Dolan"8 suggested a further extension of the "same locality" rule. The
Court commented: "If the same general locality is meant, as, for in-
stance, the Northwest, or the state, no fault could be found with such a
rule." 14
Current Status of the "Locality" Rule
Due to the vast changes which have taken place in this country
since the Small case (1880),15 such as improved communications, im-
proved medical education, rural population increases, to mention a few,
the reasons for using the narrow "same" or "similar" locality rule no
longer exist. Due to these advances, medical practices and standards of
care are approaching more uniformity throughout the country. The West
Virginia Court, in the recent case of Hundley v. Martinez,10 stated that
the reasons for the strict application of the locality rule requiring
medical expert witnesses to be familiar with the local practices have al-
most disappeared, but the Court was careful to caution that the rule
is not to be abolished in all instances.
There is some evidence that the local doctor may be held to a stand-
ard of practice actually greater than that which currently exists within
his community, if he has the means of obtaining greater knowledge be-
cause of its close geographical proximity to a larger city. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the case of Brune v. Belinkof i 1 7 held
that the standard of care of a specialist was not to be measured by the
skill and ability of the average physician practicing the specialty, taking
into account the advances in the particular specialty and the medical
facilities available. In this case the defendant was an anesthesiology
specialist practicing in New Bedford, Massachusetts, which is slightly
more than 50 miles from Boston, one of the medical centers of the na-
tion.18 The defendant administered a spinal anesthetic to the plaintiff
containing an excessive dosage of pontocaine causing subsequent numb-
13 Viita v. Dolan, supra note 9.
14 Vilta v. Dolan, supra note 9, at 1081.
15 Small v. Howard, supra note 4. Courts have noted changes in conditions of
medical training and advances in communications and transportation which have
taken place since 1880. See, for example, Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App.2d 247, 288
P.2d 1003, 1017 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
16 151 W. Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967).
17 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968).
18 According to 1960 Census figures and later estimates derived from the Census
Bureau, New Bedford, Mass., has a population of 102,477 while metropolitan Boston
has a population of 3,174,000. The Court took judicial notice of the fact that Boston
ranks as one of the nation's leading medical centers. According to figures released
by the Boston Chamber of Commerce there are 53 major hospitals in the greater
Boston area, with personnel totaling over 34,000.
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ness and weakness in the plaintiff's left leg. The court, in holding for
the plaintiff, specifically overruled Small v. Howard.19 The Massa-
chusetts Court stated: "We are of the opinion that the "locality" rule of
Small v. Howard which measures a physician's conduct by the standards
of other doctors in similar communities is not suited to present-day
conditions." 20
The Court took note of the fact that the defendant practiced only
50 miles from one of the nation's leading medical centers and held that
he should be held to the higher standards of care prevailing in Boston.
The Massachusetts Court seemed to be striving toward a uniform stand-
ard of care in the case of medical specialties. If the doctor holds him-
self out as a specialist in a particular field, it seems that he should be
held to the high standards of care which generally prevail nationally in
that specialty.
Other jurisdictions have abandoned the "locality" rule in cases in-
volving the medical malpractice of specialists. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey in Carbone v. Warburton2' held the specialist to the special
degree of skill which is normally possessed by the average specialist in
that field. The Court allowed a New York doctor to testify as to the
standards of care necessary for the treatment of a broken leg. The Court
said that: "the testimony may be supplied by physicians qualified by
their own knowledge and experience in the same profession." 22 The
expert witness need not be from the same locality. In this case the Court
specifically stated that the "locality" rule is not followed in the state
of New Jersey.23
The "locality" rule was recently struck down in the state of Wash-
ington in Pederson v. Dumouchel.24 This was an action brought by a
patient against the physician, dentist, and hospital to recover for brain
19 Small v. Howard, supra note 4.
20 Brune v. Belinkoff, supra note 17, at 798. In medical malpractice cases there is a
present tendency to abandon the strict application of the locality rule. Courts
instruct the jury to treat the size and character of the community as one factor to
be taken into account in applying the general professional standard of care. See,
McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950); Flock v. J.C. Palumbo
Fruit Co., 63 Idaho 220, 118 P.2d 707 (1941); Hodgson v. Bigelow, 335 Pa. 497, 7 A.2d
338 (1939); Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955), (three Chicago doctors
testified as to the standard of care pertinent to a case arising in Orlando, Florida;
Curran, Tracy's, The Doctor as a Witness 164-165 (W. B. Saunders Co., 1965).
21 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953). Courts agree that a specialist may be held to a
higher standard of skill and care than a general practitioner. See, for example,
Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181 (3rd Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 980 (1952). See
also, Note, 14 Stan. L.R. 884 (1962).
22 Id. at 683.
23 Carbone v. Warburton, supra note 21. The locality rule has been modified by
statute in Wisconsin. W.S.A. § 147.14 (b) provides, "A court may permit any person
to testify as an expert witness on a medical subject in any action or judicial pro-
ceeding where proof is offered satisfactory to the court that such person is qualified
as such expert."
24 431 P.2d 973 (Wash. 1967).
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damage alleged to be a result of the operation. The Supreme Court of
Washington stated that the "locality" rule has two practical faults: first,
the lack of qualified experts in the locality who are willing to testify; and
second, the possibility that a small group of careless physicians could
establish a local standard of care that is far below that which the law
requires. The Court stated: "Negligence cannot be excused on the
ground that others in the same locality practice the same kind of negli-
gence." 25 The Court went on to say:
The "locality" rule has no present day vitality except that it may
be considered as one of the elements to determine the degree of
care and skill which is to be expected of the average practitioner
of the class to which he belongs. . . . In other words, local prac-
tice within geographic proximity is one, but not the only factor to
be considered. No longer is it proper to limit the definition of the
standard of care which a medical doctor or dentist must meet, solely
to the practice of custom of a particular locality, a similar locality,
or geographic area.2
6
The Court stated that this standard of care not only applies to physicians
but also to hospitals.2 7 The hospitals are similar to physicians in that
they are members of national organizations and are subject to accredita-
tion. The Washington Court held the hospital negligent in that it
breached one of its own rules in allowing a surgical operation upon
a patient under general anesthetic without the presence of a medical
doctor in the operating room.
28
The "Locality" Rule in Hospital Cases
The "locality" rule, as discussed above, had developed from cases
involving the medical malpractice of physicians. This same rule has
also been applied in cases involving the medical negligence of hospitals.
Courts have generally applied the "locality" rule, as it developed
in physician malpractice cases, to cases involving hospitals. Many
jurisdictions find the two situations analogous. As such, if the jurisdic-
tion applied the strict, "same locality" rule in physician malpractice
cases, it applied the same rule in hospital cases. In the early case of
Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Branton,29 the Alabama Supreme Court,
in a suit brought against the hospital by a father for injuries to his wife
and newborn child, held that the hospital's duty is that degree of care
25 Id. at 977.
26 Id. at 978.
27 Id.
28 Pederson v. Dumouchel, supra note 24. The Supreme Court of Washington fol-
lowed the Pederson rule in the recent case of Douglas v. Bussabarger, 438 P.2d 829
(Wash. 1968), by holding that rural or small town doctors are not entitled to have
a different standard of care than doctors in larger cities.
29 218 Ala. 464, 118 So. 741 (1928).
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used by hospitals generally in that community. The "same" or "simi-
lar locality" rule as applied to physicians in New Hampshire was like-
wise applied to hospitals in Carrigan v. Roman Catholic Bishop Sacred
Heart Hospital.30 The New Hampshire Court said that the standard
of care is neither doubtful nor disputed. The defendants "were re-
quired to possess the knowledge and to exercise the care and skill of
the ordinary hospital or practitioner in the same or similar localities." 31
The New Hampshire Court saw no distinction between the hospital
and physician in the application of the "locality" rule.
The Supreme Court of Washington in Teig v. St. John's Hospital,3 2
allowed testimony by a Portland, Oregon doctor in a malpractice action
arising in Longview, Washington. Portland is 50 miles from Longview.
Applying the "same" or "similar locality" rule to hospitals, the court
allowed the testimony because the doctor answered to a direct question
that he was familiar with the standard of practice of medicine and
surgery in the general locality of Longview. In a later case, Washington
disregarded the "locality" rule in cases involving the malpractice of
physicians, 3 3 and then also disregarded it in cases where hospitals are
involved.3 4
The current status of the "locality" rule as applied in hospital cases
is very similar to the status of the same rule as applied in physician
cases. Courts which have been reluctant to modify the "strict locality"
rule in physician malpractice cases have consistently applied the same
strict rule in hospital cases.35 There does, however, seem to be a trend
beginning wherein the hospital is likened to a physician practicing a
specialty. As such, the standard of care required of a hospital, like the
specialist, is relatively consistent over a wide geographical area.36 This
uniformity in the standard of care suggests that a non-resident, expert
witness would be competent to testify as to local hospital standards not-
withstanding the fact that he had never practiced in the local area.
This general line of reasoning was used by the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia in the recent case of Duling v. Bluefield
30 104 N.H. 73, 178 A.2d 502 (1962).
31 Id. at 503.
32 63 Wash.2d 369, 387 P.2d 527 (1963).
33 Pederson v. Dumouchel, supra note 24.
34 Ibid.
35 Bradshaw v. Iowa Methodist Hospital, 251 Iowa 375, 101 N.W.2d 167 (1960); Gar-
field Memorial Hospital v. Marshall, 92 U.S. App. D.C. 234, 204 F.2d 721, 37 A.L.R.2d
1270 (1952); Simmons v. South Shore Hospital, 340 Ill. App. 153, 91 N.E.2d 135(1950); Goff v. Doctor's General Hospital of San Jose, 166 Cal. App.2d 314, 333
P.2d 29 (1958).
36 Carson v. City of Beloit, 32 Wis.2d 282, 145 N.W.2d 112 (1966). The court stated
that the public had a right to expect high professional standards.
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Sanitorium, Inc.37 This was an action against a private hospital based
upon the negligence of its nurses in failing to properly care for their
patient, a young girl suffering from rheumatic fever. As a result of the
nurses' negligence in failing to telephone the attending physician, the
young girl suffered heart failure and died. The West Virginia Court
permitted a doctor from New York to testify as to general hospital prac-
tices. The Court stated:
In an action against a private hospital based upon negligence of
nurses employed by the Hospital in failing properly to attend and
care for a patient . .. it is proper to admit testimony of physicians,
or of other qualified persons, concerning the usual standards em-
ployed by nurses in caring for patients in hospitals. Such stand-
ards need not relate merely to the general area in which the hos-
pital is situated and it is not necessary that such witnesses reside
in the general area in which the hospital is situated or that they be
acquainted with such standards in that area.
38
The West Virginia Court distinguished between this action against
a hospital and an action against a physician for malpractice. The court
apparently would apply the "locality" rule in a case involving a physician
but not in a case involving a hospital. The Court stated that the trial
court erred in excluding in its entirety the testimony of the expert wit-
ness from consideration by the jury merely on the ground that he was
not acquainted with the proper and usual standards of accredited hos-
pitals in the local community. The court emphasized that this case did
not involve a medical malpractice action, but rather an action in negli-
gence. 39
There is some confusion as to what constitutes malpractice as op-
posed to negligence in cases involving hospitals. Some courts hold that
if the hospital activity involved a nurse it is negligence and if it involved
a physician it is malpractice.
40
The distinction made between a medical malpractice action and a
negligence action against a hospital in the Duling case is interesting in
that it points out that hospitals are subject to a more uniform standard
of care than are general practitioner physicians. This is especially true
today where most reputable hospitals in the United States have been ac-
credited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.
4 1
37 149 W. Va. 567, 142 S.E.2d 754 (1965).
38 Id. at 756-757.
39 Id. at 765.
40 See, G. G. Kinkela and R. V. Kinkela, Hospital Nurses and Tort Liability, 18
Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 53 (1969); Appleman, Hospital Liability for Act of Non-salaried
Staff Physician, Personal Injury Annual 189 (1964).
41 The Joint Commission was organized in 1953 by the American Hospital Associ-
ation, the American Medical Association, the American College of Surgeons, the
American College of Physicians and the Canadian Medical Association. See, Re-
port of Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, 167 J.A.M.A. 1940 (1958).
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By adopting the Joint Commission's model by-laws and regula-
tions an accredited hospital in one portion of the United States assumes
a similar standard of care and conduct as do other accredited hospitals
in other portions of the country. If the hospital community now recog-
nizes, and operates under, a national standard of care, why shouldn't
the courts recognize it as well? Under such a new rule, a non-resident,
expert witness who is familiar with the standard of care used by hospitals
generally would be competent to testify as to the local standard of care
notwithstanding the fact that he had never practiced in that community.
It is interesting to note that the English courts follow this "national"
rule in determining the standard of care required.42 In England the
same standard of care is applicable throughout the country. Lord Nathan
in his treatise on Medical Negligence states that the "locality" rule has
never been suggested in England. 43
Several recent cases involving hospitals suggest that the "locality"
rule is no longer applicable in this country. In Darling II v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hospital,44 an action was brought against the
hospital whose alleged negligence caused the amputation of the plain-
tiff's leg. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that it was not error to
refuse to instruct the jury that the customary standards of the com-
munity establish the duty of the hospital. 45 The court also found that
evidence of state hospital regulations and national hospital accreditation
standards was relevant to aid the jury in deciding what the hospital
knew or should have known concerning hospital responsibilities for the
care of their patients.46 The hospital was charged with the duty to com-
ply with every recommendation of the Joint Commission on Accredita-
tion and the rules and regulations of the Department of Public Health
of Illinois.47 In disposing of the "locality" rule, the Appellate Court of
Illinois, Fourth District, stated:
• . . we believe that conformity with the standard of care observed
by other hospitals in good standing in the same community cannot
necessarily in itself be availed of as a defense in a negligence ac-
tion where the criterion relied upon is shown to constitute negli-
gence, in that it fails to guard against injuries to the patient in the
failure to meet standards of care self-imposed or established ...
The duty of a hospital may not be fulfilled merely by utilizing the
means at hand in the particular city where the hospital is located.4 8
42 See, Fleming, Developments in the English Law of Medical Liability, 12 Vand.
L.R. 633 (1959).
43 Nathan, Medical Negligence 21 (Butterworth & Co., Ltd. 1957).
44 50 Ill. App.2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964); affd., 33 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, 14
A.L.R.3d 860 (1965); cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946, 86 S. Ct. 1204, 16 L.Ed.2d 209 (1965).
45 33 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, 14 A.L.R.3d 860 (1965).
46 Ibid.
47 Id.
48 Darling II v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, supra note 44, at 200
N.E.2d 179.
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The Darling II case held that the defendant hospital was to be
judged by a standard of care created by the national accreditation rules
and the rules and regulations of the state's department of public health.49
Such a holding, obviously lends support to the proposition that a non-
resident, expert witness would be competent to testify in a negligence
case involving a hospital.
This same question was dealt with in the case of Avey v. St. Francis
Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc.50 The trial court refused to admit into
evidence the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness because he had
never practiced medicine in the City of Wichita, Kansas, the location of
the defendant hospital. The expert witness was licensed to practice
medicine in Kansas and was otherwise qualified. The Supreme Court
of Kansas reversed the trial court and held that such a non-resident,
expert witness is competent to testify if he is familiar with the hospital
standards in other, similar communities. The court noted that the
standard of care required of hospitals has become more uniform in re-
cent years and in their judgment the need for emphasis on locality no
longer exists.5 1 The standardization of hospital and nursing procedures,
brought about by the Kansas statutes, and the standards of the joint
commission on hospital accreditation, serve to de-emphasize the strict
application of geographic locality.
52
In the Kapuschinsky v. United States,5 3 the Federal District Court
of South Carolina followed the modern trend in favoring a "national"
standard of care in cases involving hospitals. This action was brought
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The plain-
tiffs alleged that due to the negligence of the U.S. Naval Hospital, their
new born baby was allowed to come in contact with pathogenic organism
or "hospital staph." As a result, the baby suffered a permanent disloca-
tion of the right hip and deterioration of the left hip. The court rejected
the "locality" rule and allowed a non-resident expert to testify as to the
desirability of certain hospital safeguards.5 4 In disposing of the "locality"
rule, the court cited the Duling case, 55 and noted, "it seems that in a
negligence, as opposed to a malpractice, action against a hospital, na-
tional standards are relevant." 56
49 Ibid., supra note 45.
50 Avey v. St. Francis Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc., supra note 1.
51 Ibid.
52 Id.
53 248 F. Supp. 732 (D.C. S.C. 1966).
54 Ibid.
55 Duling v. Bluefield Sanitarium, Inc., supra note 37.
56 Kapuschinsky v. United States, supra note 53, at 744. See also, United States v.
Cannon, 217 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1954) court applied "similar" locality rule.
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Conclusion
In the light of modern advances within the medical profession, the
"locality" rule no longer seems applicable as a means of establishing
the standard of care against which hospitals are to be measured. The
nation-wide uniformity of hospital standards brought about by the
Joint Commission on Hospital Accreditation, supports the proposition
that the out-of-date "locality" rule should be replaced by a "national"
rule in determining the hospital's standard of care. With the adoption
of a "national" standard of care a non-resident expert witness would
be deemed competent to testify as to hospital standards notwithstanding
the fact that he never practiced in the particular community.
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol18/iss3/10
